ExtraLove.com
everyone needs
a warm hug,
a heartfelt squeeze,
bright sunshine — Extra Love
Free Ashleigh. Child abuse in Fla.The sordid facts from Florida that imprisoned a 3-year-old child for nearly 4 years!
09 May 03 — Following is the latest petition that the Florida Supreme Court has accepted in Ashleigh's case. We pray for the justices to carry out justice. The formatting differs from the original, but the content has not been altered.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
_______________________
CASE NO. SC03-606
Lower Tribunal Case No. 4D03-542
_______________________
P.S.A.,
Petitioner
vs.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Respondent
_______________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(Expedited Consideration Sought)
_______________________
Paul Scott Abbott
7130 Granada Blvd.
Miramar, FL 33023
(954) 962-2503
Petitioner, Pro Se
TABLE OF CONTENTS.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ———————————————— iv
CERTIFICATE OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE—————————viii
JURISDICTION.............................................................................. 1
FACTS............................................................................................. 2
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT.................................................. 12
ARGUMENT................................................................................... 12

THE ACTIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF PARENTAL, CIVIL, LEGAL, MORAL, HUMAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO IMPOSING DE FACTO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AS SET FORTH IN FLA. STAT. 39.802 AND 39.806 AND THUS SAID DE FACTO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE STRICKEN AND LOWER COURT(S) BE DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENT DUE PROCESS AND REVIEW INITIATION OF THE PROCESS OF RENEWED FATHER-CHILD CONTACT

A. THE COURT SHALL REVIEW THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO FLA.R.APP.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii) AS THE LOWER COURTS HAVE RULED AGAINST VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTE
-i-
AND/OR PROVISION OF STATE CONSTITUTION AND EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY MANDAMUS JURISDICTION....................... 13

B. THE DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS ARE CONTRARY TO A PLETHORA OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STATUTES AND CASE LAW THAT WOULD SERVE TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO BE A PARENT, PASSING UPON A QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE. .............................................................................. 13

C. THE REMEDY............................................................................... 23
1. Restoration of Parental Rights..................................................... 23
2. Institution of Due Process........................................................... 24
CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.............................................................. 26
APPENDIX:
A. Motion for Rehearing... (Sept. 23, 2002)................... App. 1-14
B. Order (Oct. 8, 2002)................................................. App. 15-17
C. Motion to Schedule or Rule... (Oct. 15, 2002)........ App. 18-22

-ii-

D. Order Denying Motion for Rehearing (Jan. 8, 2003).App. 23-24
E. Motion to Dismiss... (Feb. 20, 2003)........................ App. 25-28
F. Order (Feb. 26, 2003)..................................................... App. 29
G. Motion for Rehearing/... (March 3, 2003)................ App. 30-44
H. Order (March 13, 2003).................................................. App. 45
I. Order...Father Partially Indigent (May 11, 2001)..... App. 46-49

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI (1984)... 17
Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901 (1982)............................................ 21
Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976)................ 19
Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S.D.C. of Michigan (1985)................. 14
Driessen v. State, 431 So 2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1983)............................ 8
Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347 (1976).................................. 14
Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593 (1956)................................................. 21
Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397,399,401 (Fla. 1992).......... 2
Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595-599; US Ct App (1983)......................... 19
G.C. and D.C. v. Department of Children and Families, 791 So 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).......11
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)............ 21
Gross v. State of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257 (1963)............. 20
In re: J.S. and C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489............ 17
In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364; Utah (1982)................................. 21
In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584 (1980). 16
Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir (1985).......... 18

-iv-

K.R.V. v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 4D00-2740 (Fla 4th DCA 2001)........................................................................................................... 11
Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).................. 16
Linning v. Duncan, 169 So. 2d 862,866 (Fla. 1964).............................. 2
Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973)............................. 17
Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)............................ 16
Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI app Div (1983)....................... 19
May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843 (1952)............. 17
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262, 426 US 390; 43 S Ct 625 (1923)................... 18
Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 440 US 278 (1979).......................................... 20
P.A. v. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 685 S. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) ....23
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 US 429 (1984).................................................... 20
Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN (1972)...20
Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1992).............. 2
P.O., the mother, v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 4D02-2391 (Fla. 4th DCA, March 5, 2003) ..........................................................................................23
Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56 (1978)............... 18
Reynold v. Baby Fold Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL (1977)............................................................................................... 16
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973)........... 22

-v-

R.U. v. Department of Children & Families, Case No. 4D00-1586 (Fla. 4th DCA, Feb. 14, 2001)................................................................................................................. 10
Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745 (1982)............................. 15
S.D. v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 3D00-3086 (Fla 3d DCA 2001).............................................. 15
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208 (1972)......................... 18
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376 (1975)................... 20
State of Florida v. Townsend, 635 So 2d 949 (Fla. 1994)......................... 7
Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38 (1985)...........Wise v. Bravo, 666 F 2d 1328 (1981)...............................................................................................................22
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886).................................................... 15

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fla. Const. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(8)....................................................................... 2
Fla. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9................................................................................. 11
Fla. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 23.............................................................................. 15
U.S. Const. 1st Amend. ............................................................................... 14, 17
U.S. Const. 5th Amend. ................................................................................ 11, 14, 16, 19
U.S. Const. 6th Amend. ................................................................................ 11
U.S. Const. 9th Amend. ................................................................................ 14, 17, 21, 22

-vi-

U.S. Const. 14th Amend. ..................... 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
STATUTES
Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii)....................................................1, 13
Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v)....................................................1, 13
Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(3).............................................................. 1, 13
Fla. Stat. 39.802............................................................................ 4, 12, 24
Fla. Stat. 39.806............................................................................ 4, 12, 24
Fla. Stat. 90.801(1)(c).................................................................. 8
Fla. Stat. 90.802.............................................................................8
Fla. Stat. 90.803 (23).................................................................... 8
OTHER
Declaration of Independence................................................ 18, 21
Fourth District Court of Appeal Revised Notice to Attorneys and Parties (Rev. 8/30/02)....................................................................................... 4
The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, by Gerald Kogan and Robert Craig Waters (1993), 18 Nova.L.Rev. 1151 (1994).................. 1
Title 42 USC 1983 ..........22


-vii-

CERTIFICATE OF FONT SIZE AND STYLE
This Petition is typed using a Times New Roman 14-point font.

-viii-

JURISDICTION
This Court shall review decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii). Furthermore, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) discretionary jurisdiction may be sought to review decisions of district courts of appeal that pass upon a question of great public importance, such as denial of parental and other human rights without due process, and as verified by its discussion at the June 3, 2002, House Oversight Committee's hearing in Orlando, at which the undersigned was attacked by an Orange County Sheriff's deputy as TV cameras rolled. In addition, Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(3) provides for this Court jurisdiction for issuance of all necessary writs to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. Finally, as cited by The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, by Gerald Kogan and Robert Craig Waters (1993), 18 Nova.L.Rev. 1151 (1994), the fact that a petitioner merely asks for mandamus vests the Court with jurisdiction. In this above-captioned case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the new case as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus on April 15, 2003, and gave the undersigned through May 5, 2003, to serve an appropriate proper petition.

Specifically, this Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus directed to state officers and/or state agencies, pursuant to aforementioned Florida
-1-
Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as Fla. Const. Art. V, 3(b)(8), including over judges and courts, and such writ may be used when exercise of right is denied in lower courts, see Linning v. Duncan, 169 So. 2d 862,866 (Fla. 1964), and may thus be incorporated under mandamus, see Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1992). Additionally, this Court's exercise of mandamus issuance is jurisdictionally proper in cases such as this in which there is likelihood of injury and/or irreparable harm if writ is not issued, see Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397,399 (Fla. 1992) and/or when petitioner lacks other remedy, Ibid. at 401.
FACTS
Petitioner is a Florida citizen and Father of one Child, a grossly aggrieved daughter who recently turned age 8, and both Father and Child have been subject to violation of parental/familial, civil, legal, moral, human and constitutional rights including but not limited to upholding the de facto Termination of Parental Rights without due process or evidentiary hearing, most recently evidenced by the Feb. 26, 2003, and March 13, 2003, orders of the Fourth District Court of Appeal (appended hereto) and underlying orders, including those of Oct. 8, 2002, and Jan. 8, 2003, issued by the Honorable Marcia Beach, in Case No. 98-5479 CJDP in the Circuit
-2-
Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida (also appended hereto), thus causing a mistake of law that raises substantial questions of great public importance and/or warranting immediate review by this Court, as delineated hereon.

Pursuant to the Fourth District Court of Appeal Revised Notice to Attorneys and Parties (Rev. 8/30/02), this case shall be expedited as it involves adoption, termination of parental rights and/or other significant issues related to substantial interests of a Child. Additionally, pursuant to prior Order Declaring Father Partially Indigent (appended hereto), appeal costs for the Father/Petitioner shall be waived.

The Court of Appeal latest rulings as cited above upheld a de facto Termination of Parental Rights without due process and without evidentiary hearing, as specifically outlined in detail in Fla. Stat. 39.802 and Fla. Stat. 39.806, with said procedures and grounds entirely denied and neglected in this case at hand. The Court of Appeal acceptance of Appellee's arguments in its motion filed Feb. 20, 2003 (appended hereto), denied the Father/Appellant/Petitioner the ability to appeal the Jan. 8., 2003, Order, and forced the continued permanent separation of Father and Minor Child that has been permitted to be in place completely for more than two years without application of due process and safeguard of rights.

In reality, the very nature of termination of protective supervision in itself
-3-
supports the contention that de facto Termination of Parental Rights has occurred, as the Attorney ad Litem himself has stated that if there were to be contact permitted between Father and Minor Child under the terms allegedly available that protective supervision would necessarily have to remain in place.

The termination of protective supervision, attested to in the Appellee motion, therefore in itself proves the Circuit Court's intent to de facto terminate parental rights of the Father.

Furthermore, it is not possible for the Father to seek consent of the Minor Child's therapist when he has been denied information even as to said therapist's identity.

It is equally not possible for the Father to seek consent of the Minor Child, who turned 8 last month, when he has been denied information even as to his Minor Child's specific whereabouts.

In addition, it would not be possible for the Father/Appellant/Petitioner to file his appellate brief in this matter without transcript of the hearing of Sept. 20, 2002, which, although requested by Designation to Court Reporter, as of the below date is not completed and available, and which was deemed moot by Order of the Court of Appeal, thus placing him under further undue prejudice.

In reviewing the facts in this matter and the applicable law, it is clear that
-4-
denial of the latest appeal deprives not only the Father but moreover the Minor Child of civil, legal, moral, human and constitutional rights, and establishes a periolous precedent for all parents, children and families in this State, as delineated below:

This matter has been extensively litigated over the period, during which the Minor Child has been greatly aggrieved, since the seizure of the Minor Child in April 1998, on an allegation that she was at imminent risk of neglect by her Father because he allegedly failed to protect her because she returned home from a family-court-ordered afternoon supervised visit with her mentally ill child-abuser Mother with a fat lip, said injury promptly reported to authorities by the Father; with the State's most recent in its apparent attempts at justification of the Minor Child's seizure and secrecy from her Father and contentions for the Minor Child's being denied contact with her Father being related to unsubstantiated allegations of alleged molestation of the Minor Child on the part of the Father that were made as media began reporting sexual molestation of the Minor Child having been suffered at a group emergency shelter to which she had been indefinitely banished by a judge who'd soon be appointed by Gov. Bush to (and later forced to resign from, under pressure instigated by the Father/Petitioner among others) the position of Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families.
-5-
To this date, no statutorially mandated trial on Termination of Parental Rights has been held in this matter; however, parental rights of the Father have been terminated de facto, as he has been ostensibly denied access to his Daughter and only child for more than 2 years and has no foreseeable indication he will ever be permitted to see his Daughter again.

Furthermore, although the Circuit Court has noted the importance it places upon the desires of the Minor Child in such circumstances, and it is apparent that this Minor Child's thoughts have been substantially manipulated by the Mother and/or agent or agents of the State, this matter has never been subject to a Frye/Daubert taint/reliability/admissibility hearing.

At a judicial review hearing on the late afternoon of Friday, Sept. 20, 2002, the Circuit Court stated that it was terminating State supervision in this case and further that it would not permit even strictly supervised visitation between the Minor Child and the Father who had admirably raised her singlehandedly from her infancy until her seizure in April 1998.

Although representations by the Mother's counsel and others were that the termination of State supervision was noticed for this judicial review hearing, the fact remains, as pointed out by the Father at said hearing, that the termination of State supervision was not noticed for this hearing and that, in fact, the Judicial
-6-
Review Social Study Report/Case Plan Update received via Federal Express by the Father approximately 48 hours prior to the hearing time clearly stated on page 6 thereof that it was the intent to continue protective supervision as well as stated that various services were to continue, which even the Circuit Court noted caused it confusion, and it was only within 10 minutes of the scheduled starting time of said hearing that the Father was verbally notified in the hallway by Assistant Attorney General Adrian Ashton that this was an alleged "error" and that the intent was to terminate protective supervision, thus the Father having been denied due process and the sufficient time and ability to prepare and respond.

The Father questioned the reliability and admissibility of alleged statements of his Child regarding seeing her Father, which were represented by the Attorney ad Litem to being noncommittal, e.g., shoulder shrugging, although represented by the Guardian ad Litem Program attorney as to being no interest whatsoever, and the Father cited, based upon previous information, including that of professional reports citing the Minor Child's increased understanding and acceptance of damage inflicted upon her by her Father (damage never proven and, in fact, now apparently disproven by internationally recognized expertise), that any statements or reactions of the Minor Child relative to her Father should thus be considered as tainted. Concerns related thereto parallel those addressed in State of Florida v.
-7-
Townsend, 635 So 2d 949 (Fla. 1994), in which the Supreme Court held that the competency of a child is a factor that should be considered in determining the trustworthiness and reliability and thus the admissibility of hearsay statements, concerns also addressed in Fla. Stat. 90.803 (23), Fla. Stat. 90.801(1)(c) and Fla. Stat. 90.802, with said admissions having been held as reversible error, see Driessen v. State, 431 So 2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1983).

As stated by the Attorney ad Litem, protective supervision would have to remain in place with the initiation of supervised visitation between Father and Minor Child.

Statements of the Circuit Court even prior to hearing any testimony, evidence or argument in this hearing are highly indicative of a predispository nature, which in itself cries for rehearing and/or other appropriate relief.

The Circuit Court was presented with the Father's Motion to Commence Reunification Process and for Injunctive Relief in Best Interest of Minor Child, which cited, in part, that the Father, even while various matters have been on appeal, including with issues related to his out-of-state expert psychosexual and polygraph evaluations before the Supreme Court of Florida (Case No. SC02-1710), had, at substantial personal expense, inconvenience, duress and mental anguish, including having to go out of state multiple times for examinations that included
-8-

wiring of his genitalia while he was forced to view pornographic video among other horrendous procedures, nonetheless proceeded with said evaluative processes and that said evaluative processes successfully completed all facets of the Case Plan of the Father completable at that time. In fact, Circuit Court Judge Beach stated explicitly at a hearing earlier the same year (page 102 of transcript of hearing of Jan. 29, 2002, in the above-captioned matter, emphasis added):

I will add to the comment -- that comment the fact that if this father after submitting to and receiving a psychosexual either is deemed -- What is the best word to use?

Not clean, but is cleared of the allegations, does not face additional requirements as ordered by the examining professional, and/or if he is required to do certain tasks before that professional can agree that he should be reunified with his child.

In either case, everyone should expect that that will occur. Which will actually take us back in time a number of years. Will it not? A number of years that in the life of this child have been spent out of a home environment with either parent.

And on page 103 of the same transcript, to the Father:

You'll be able to enjoy -- If in fact things go well, you'll be able to enjoy a relationship with this child.

Evaluative reports, from internationally recognized experts in respective fields, do not indicate that there is any evidence that the Father ever molested his Child and further recommend commencement of the reunification process, per
-9-
Exhibits A and B attached to said Motion. Thus, for the Circuit Court to act in a manner other than consistent with the previous promise/representation and thesubsequent recommendation would be outside the realm of proper conduct and represent abuse of discretion and other improper action, indicative of lack of federally and State mandated scrupulous fairness and impartiality and of failure to protect constitutional rights, on the part of the Circuit Court that had made such promises/representations, purportedly in good faith.

The Circuit Court nonetheless, and even notwithstanding the fact that the Fourth District Court of Appeal to which that very Circuit answers has ruled that even in cases in which a Father would refuse to cooperate with such evaluations that such actions would be as consistent with innocence as guilt (see R.U. v. Department of Children & Families, Case No. 4D00-1586, (Fla. 4th DCA, Feb. 14, 2001)), stated that it was concluding that the Father was to be construed as not in substantial compliance with his Case Plan, a plan that had remained in the appellate process until approximately 90 days prior to that day's hearing and that had been completed as much as possible by the Father, the only remaining being parenting action that would require Father-Child face-to-face contact that has been denied due to the de facto Termination of Parental Rights without due process.

The decision of the Circuit Court is contrary to the law and evidence
-10-
presented (see K.R.V. v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 4D00-2740 (Fla 4th DCA 2001)), represents abuse of discretion, denial of due process and confrontation in violation of Article I Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and caters to the malicious intents of authorities retaliating against the Father for his standing up to a system that unjustly seized and secretted his Minor Child and of a mentally ill Mother with a history of felony child abuse, pregnant suicide attempt and numerous other concerns to, as even cited in her own sworn notarized statement of Jan. 31, 2000, reverse the rightful rulings of the family court.

The Circuit Court indicated that its determination of lack of compliance was based largely upon delays in Case Plan completion that it attributed to the Father, whereas evidence shows that the matter remained on appeal, that numerous providers declined to participate in the process (for reasons not related to any refusal on the Father's part, ranging from risk management concerns related to the Father's exertion of rights to the State's continuing lack of specific allegations against the Father) and that the various authorities who have conspired with the Mother against the Father were as much or more responsible than any other party or parties. Finding of blame against the Father in this regard would fail to pass the "competent substantial evidence" test set forth through G.C. and D.C. v.
-11-
Department of Children and Families, 791 So 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus directed at the Fourth District Court of
Appeal and/or 17th Judicial Circuit for review of this matter and/or striking of the de facto Termination of Parental Rights and implementation of due process and/or review of initiation of the process of renewed Father-Child contact, or, in the alternative, the striking and/or amendment of any and all Florida Statues, including but not limited to Fla. Stat. 39.802 and Fla. Stat. 39.806, as delineating Termination of Parental Rights as ignored in this matter, pursuant to facts and argument stated above and below.

ARGUMENT
THE ACTIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS CONSTITUTE
VIOLATIONS OF PARENTAL, CIVIL, LEGAL, MORAL,
HUMAN AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO IMPOSING DE FACTO TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AS SET
FORTH IN FLA. STAT. 39.802 AND 39.806 AND THUS SAID
DE FACTO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD
BE STRICKEN AND LOWER COURT(S) BE DIRECTED TO
IMPLEMENT DUE PROCESS AND REVIEW INITIATION OF THE PROCESS OF RENEWED FATHER-CHILD CONTACT
-12-

A. THE COURT SHALL REVIEW THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO FLA.R.APP.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii) AS THE LOWER COURTS HAVE RULED AGAINST VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTE AND/OR PROVISION OF STATE CONSTITUTION AND EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY MANDAMUS JURISDICTION

As described above in the section entitled "JURISDICTION," this Supreme Court is in the unique position of being able to ensure proper application of state statutes and/or to remedy those matters in which said proper application has failed to occur due to the action or action of a state official or officials and/or state agency or agencies. Herein, this petition, for means of economy, reiterates the above facts and the matters addressed in the "JURISDICTION" section, as well as preiterates the arguments detailed in section "B," infra. It is clear that pursuant to the stated applications of Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii), 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) and 9.030(a)(3), respectively, that exercise of mandamus jurisdiction is appropriate due to the lower courts invalidation of state stature, issues of such great public importance as sanctity of the family and due process and this Court's ability to issue all necessary writs to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction, in an expedited manner in matters involving children. This is particularly vital in light of the legal issues addressed in the following section.

B. THE DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS ARE CONTRARY TO A PLETHORA OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STATUTES
-13-

AND CASE LAW THAT WOULD SERVE TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO BE A PARENT, PASSING UPON A QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

To fully understand the gravity of the matter at hand, it is vital to view it within the context of the fact that the lower court actions are contrary to a plethora of Constitutional rights, statutes and case law federally and of the several states that would serve to protect the right to be a parent, including but not limited to:

1) The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by Amendments 1, 5, 9 and 14. See Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S.D.C. of Michigan (1985).

2) The several states has not greater power to restrain individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than it does the Congress of the United States. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38 (1985).

3) Loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. See Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427-14-US 347 (1976).

4) Law and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" are deemed as being discriminatory and violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886).

5) Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. Moreover, there must be conclusive evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely a preponderance of evidence, to terminate a parent's right of access to his or her child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745 (1982).

6) Among Florida cases upholding this right of a natural parent to fundamental liberty interest in care, custody and management of their child or children is S.D. v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 3D00-3086 (Fla 3d DCA 2001).

7) In addition, right to freedom from government intrusion is guaranteed under Art. 1, Sec. 23 of the Florida Constitution.
-15-
8) Parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children. See Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)

.
9) The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of one's children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent's custodial rights absent due process protection. See Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).

10) Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of the 5th and 14th Amendments which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. See Reynold v. Baby Fold Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL (1977).

11) Parent's interest in custody of children is a liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; a parent which is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. See In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584 (1980).

12) The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
-16-
severance in the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI (1984).
13) Father enjoys the right to associate with his child which is guaranteed by the First amendment as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. See Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973).

14) The United States Supreme Court has noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. See May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843 (1952).

15) That parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution are assured as well per In re: J.S. and C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.

16) The U.S. Supreme Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship
is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
-17-
powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a
constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208 (1972).

17) Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262, 426 US 390; 43 S Ct 625 (1923).

18) The U.S. Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56 (1978).

19) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (California) held that the parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, referencing Declaration of Independence re life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution re no state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor deny any person equal protection of the laws. See Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir (1985).
-18-

20) Echoing the thought behind the words of Marcus Tullius Cicero, that "Of all nature's gifts to the human race, what is sweeter to a man than his children?," no bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child. See Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).

21) A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult. See Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595-599; US Ct App (1983).

22) That a parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution has also been cited in Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI app Div (1983).

23) Reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict were
impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
-19-
Amendment, per Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 US 429 (1984).
24) Classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protections; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored, the state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. See Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 440 US 278 (1979).

25) The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify discrimination on the basis of gender. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376 (1975).

26) Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. See Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN (1972).

27) State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. See Gross v. State

-20-
of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257 (1963).

28) The Constitution protects and Federal and State Courts must protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of law. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).

29) The right of a parent not to be deprived of neglect is so fundamental and basic as to rank among the rights contained in this Amendment (Ninth) and Utah's Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 1. See In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364; Utah (1982).

30) The rights of parents to parent-child relationship are recognized and upheld additionally by Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593 (1956); and Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901 (1982).

31) State's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including determinations of custodial and visitation rights, is subject to scrutiny by federal judiciary within reach of due process and/or equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, applied to states through specific rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution which declares fundamental personal rights, and the 14th Amendment which encompasses and applies to statesthose preexisting fundamental rights recognized by the Ninth Amendment. The
-21-
Ninth Amendment acknowledged the prior existence of fundamental rights with it: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions has recognized that matters involving marriage, procreation and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental "liberty" interest protected by the Constitution. Thus, the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973), was described by the Supreme Court as founded on the "Constitutional underpinning of... a recognition that the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life." The noncustodial divorced parent has no way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his child except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship as the majority does, and yet deny protection under Title 42 USC 1983, to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the right completely. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F 2d 1328 (1981).

32) Finally, and compellingly, due to its recency before the 4th District Court of Appeal from which the present matter comes, it should be noted that improper
-22-
actions by the Florida Department of Children and Families have "reached epidemic proportions," as cited in P.O., the mother, v. Department of Children and Families, Case No. 4D02-2391 (Fla. 4th DCA, March 5, 2003), citing a history of upholding that orders of termination are reversible wherein DCF/HRS has conductyed itself in such manner as to not assist, let alone to obstruct, a parent from case plan completion, see P.A. v. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 685 S. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In the recent case of P.O., the mother, v. Department of Children and Families, supra, a decision issued by the 4th DCA just eight days prior to its latest decision in the matter at issue in this Petition, the 4th DCA was unanimous in disapproving of DCF actions and urging "DCF to comply with its statutorially mandated duties under Chapter 39," with Judge C.J. Polen in special concurrence making such statements as, "Deficient performance by DCF, as eivdenced in this court, has reached epidemic proportions... I am of the belief this court can practically take judicidal notice that claims alleging deficient performance on behalf of DCF are well-founded."

C. THE REMEDY
1. Restoration of Parental Rights
Pursuant to the foregoing and for the reasons described therein, it shall be
-23-
necessary for a restoration of parental rights to occur in the above-captioned matter as a fulfillment of this Court's obligation to review decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution, and its authority to proceed in such manner via issuance of writ of mandamus in decisions that pass upon a question of great public importance, specifically to direct state officers and/or state agencies, under the authorities as cited in the foregoing, particularly in matters such as this in which there is likelihood of injury and/or irreparable harm if writ is not issued.

Remedy shall be obtained by issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directed at the Fourth District Court of Appeal and/or 17th Judicial Circuit for review of this matter and/or striking of the de facto Termination of Parental Rights.

2. Institution of Due Process
Furthermore, it is prayed said Writ of Mandamus shall also compel implementation of due process and/or review of initiation of the process of renewed Father-Child contact, or, in the alternative, the striking and/or amendment of any and all Florida Statues, including but not limited to Fla. Stat. 39.802 and Fla. Stat. 39.806, as delineating Termination of Parental Rights as ignored in this matter, pursuant to facts and argument stated herein.
-24-
CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court shall proceed with issuance of Writ of Mandamus as outlined in "C. THE REMEDY" and elsewhere above, as such is the only currently available procedure at law for assurance of the best interest of the health, welfare and safety of the Minor Child and assurance of mandated rights and responsibilities of the Father/Petitioner, and as failure to do shall set a chilling precedent for all children and families in this State and beyond.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Paul Scott Abbott, Father/Petitioner, Pro Se
7130 Granada Blvd.
Miramar, FL 33023
(954) 962-2503
-25-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above, including
designated appendix, has been provided by FedEx this 3rd day of May, 2003, to the Honorable Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, Supreme Court of Florida, 500 S. Duval St., Tallahassee, FL 32399-1927 (ref. ph. 850-488-0125), and by U.S. mail this 3rd day of May, 2003, to: Adrian Ashton, AAG, 200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 600, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301; Kelley Joseph, Esq., 7797 N. University Dr., Suite 108, Tamarac, FL 33321; Margaret Hesford, Esq., 5648 W. Atlantic Blvd., Margate, FL 33063; GAL, 201 S.E. 6th Street, Room 478, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301; Richard Komando, Esq., 409 S.E. 7th St., Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301; the Honorable Marilyn Beuttenmuller, Clerk, Fourth District Court of Appeal, P.O. Box 3315, West Palm Beach, FL 33402; the Honorable Marcia Beach, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, 201 6th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301; Clerk of Court, Juvenile/Dependency Division, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, 201 6th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301.
________________________
Paul Scott Abbott, Father/Petitioner, Pro Se
7130 Granada Blvd.
Miramar, FL 33023
(954) 962-2503
-26-